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Abstract
We analyse the relative welfare e¤ects of an R&D and an output subsidy in a mixed
duopoly. We show that an R&D subsidy is benecial for society as a whole, and socially
superior to an output subsidy, when spillovers are su¢ ciently high. Otherwise, an output
subsidy is socially superior.
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1 Introduction
Public rms are present in several industries such as banking and insurance, gasoline distribu-
tion, radio, television, automobile and steel, health-care and energy (Anderson et al., 1997). As
recognised by White (1996), among others, in mixed markets where public rms coexist with
private ones there are two production-related ine¢ ciencies: the output level is sub-optimal,
and the distribution of production costs across rms is not e¢ cient. To address these two mar-
ket failures, the use of output subsidies has been proposed, and the so-called irrelevance result
has been generated (White, 1996; Pal and White, 1998; Poyago-Theotoky, 2001). This is an
important nding suggesting that privatisation does not alter welfare, as long as the regulator
can subsidise output.1
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1Fjell and Heywood (2004) provide related work showing that the irrelevance result breaks down, if the public
rm acts as a Stackelberg leader after privatisation.
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Though plentiful, the mixed market literature often ignores that public rms are key players
in R&D-intensive industries such as health-care, energy and bio-agriculture (e.g. Godø et al.,
2003). As well as empirically relevant, the study of R&D activity in mixed markets is becoming
increasingly popular from a theoretical perspective (e.g. see Poyago-Theotoky, 1998; Ishibashi
and Matsumura, 2006; Tomaru, 2007; Heywood and Ye, 2009; Cato, 2011). Only Gil-Moltó et
al. (2011), however, investigate the role of R&D subsidies as a policy instrument in a mixed
duopoly with cost-reducing R&D.2 In that context, the authors suggest that an R&D subsidy
may partly serve the same purpose as an output subsidy (p. 235), since an R&D subsidy
can tackle ine¢ ciencies related to output in addition to the ones regarding R&D. This is an
interesting nding but it also raises the question of whether the two subsidy schemes imply the
same (or similar) welfare e¤ects.
In this paper, we show that an R&D subsidy is socially superior to an output subsidy only
in specic circumstances: when technological spillovers are su¢ ciently high. The reason for this
nding is as follows. When spillovers are high, the gains from an R&D subsidy are relatively
large. This is because each rm receives a benecial cost spillover from its rival. Thus, the
cost savings under an R&D subsidy, which are substantial, can compensate for the wasteful
cost asymmetry associated with the public rms higher output relative to the private rm. If,
however, spillovers are low, then an output subsidy is socially superior to an R&D subsidy. This
result indicates that there may be a welfare-related reason to favour one subsidy scheme over
the other.
2 Model
Our model follows Gil-Moltó et al. (2011) though we depart from this study by considering the
role of output subsidies and compare them with R&D subsidies.
Consider a simple market setting consisting of a public and a private rm denoted by the
subscripts 0 and 1, respectively. We assume that rms face identical costs functions and marginal
costs are increasing.3 Moreover, rms invest in R&D to look for process innovations. As well as
its own R&D, a rm can benet from its competitors R&D via spillovers of intensity , with
2 Investments in cost-cutting are particularly important in the health-care and energy sectors (Gil-Moltó et
al., 2011).
3The assumption of diminishing returns to scale used by other authors rules out the case where the public
rm prices at marginal cost and, thus, drives the private rm out of the market.
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 2 [0; 1]. Firm is cost function is given by
Ci(qi; xi; xj) = (c  xi   xj)qi + q2i ; i 6= j; i; j 2 f0; 1g, (1)
where Xi  xi + xj is rm is e¤ectiveR&D level, which represents the total reduction in
rm is marginal cost due to R&D. The cost of investment is quadratic, reecting diminishing
returns to R&D expenditure:  (xi) = x2i ,   1. For simplicity, we normalise  to 1; which
ensures nonnegativity of all equilibrium variables.4 If sx is the R&D subsidy rate, then each
rm receives Sx(xi) = sxxi;5 while Sq(qi) = sqqi, if sq is the output subsidy rate. Assume that
the inverse demand function is p = a  Q, where p is price and Q is total output. Each rms
prot is
i = p(Q)qi   Ci(qi; xi; xj)   (xi) + Sk(ki), i 6= j; i; j 2 f0; 1g, k = x; q; (2)
The private rm maximises prot, while the public rm maximises social welfare dened as
the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS) net of subsidies (S)
SW =
Q2
2|{z}
CS
+ (i + j)| {z }
PS
  sk(ki + kj)| {z }
S
. (3)
Note that subsidies cancel out when aggregating. The timing in the model is as follows. In
stage one, the regulator commits to the level of an R&D or output subsidy so as to maximise
welfare. In stage two, rms choose simultaneously their R&D investments. In stage three, rms
compete in the product market by setting quantities. The game is solved by backward induction
to obtain its subgame-perfect equilibrium.
3 Result
To understand the social optimality of each form of subsidy, we need to consider the increase
in social welfare brought about by each subsidy. The change in social welfare can be split into
three components: SWk = CSk + PSk   Sk, k = x; q. To x ideas, consider rst the
4We discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption at the end.
5We have checked that the main result (Proposition 1) is robust to the provision of subsidies toward R&D
expenditure. The relevant proof is available from the authors on request.
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change in CS due to an R&D subsidy. This is given by
CSx = CSjs=sx   CSjs=0 (4)
where CSjs=sx denotes CS under the (optimal) R&D subsidy; and CSjs=0 denotes CS when
no subsidy is provided. Using the subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions in Appendix, it is no
surprise that CSx > 0: the use of an optimal R&D subsidy increases CS. Similarly, we observe
that CS rises under an optimal output subsidy: i.e. CSq = CSjs=sq   CSjs=0 > 0.
An R&D subsidy yields greater CS than an output subsidy if
CSx  CSq > 0
CSjs=sx   CSjs=sq > 0
 > cs (5)
where cs  0:83. Condition (5) suggests that, on CS grounds, the use of an R&D subsidy
outperforms an output subsidy, but only if spillovers are su¢ ciently high. The intuition is as
follows. In the absence of subsidies, results are consistent with Gil-Moltó et al. (2011): the
public rm produces more output than the private rm; also, even though the public rm
undertakes more R&D, it still operates at a higher marginal cost than the private rm. Thus,
the distribution of production costs across rms is not e¢ cient. As noted by White (1996),
using an output subsidy, ceteris paribus, has the e¤ect of redistributing output from the higher-
marginal-cost public rm to the lower-marginal-cost private rm. The resulting increase in
the private rms output works toward lowering total industry costs. The lower industry costs
tend to increase total output, which ceteris paribus increases CS. Importantly, when  is low,
the total cost savings under an R&D subsidy are small relative to an output subsidy. This is
because each rm receives only a limited benecial cost spillover from its rival; therefore, the
cost savings under an R&D subsidy which are small cannot o¤set the excess costs associated
with asymmetric outputs. As  rises, however, the level of total e¤ective R&D increases. The
resulting (overall) cost savings under an R&D subsidy become relatively large: they can now
o¤set the excess costs associated with asymmetric outputs. As a result, an R&D subsidy
becomes better than an output subsidy in terms of CS when spillovers are su¢ ciently high, as
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condition (5) suggests.6
We can conduct similar analysis for PS. Once again, we conrm that PS rises both with
an R&D and an output subsidy. In line with CS, we nd that the increases in PS are more
pronounced under an R&D subsidy, if spillovers are su¢ ciently high
PSx  PSq > 0
PSjs=sx   PSjs=sq > 0
 > ps (6)
where ps  0:87. This outcome can be explained by considering the two components of PS,
the public and the private rms prot. Using the subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions in Gil-
Moltó et al. (2011) and Appendix, it is fairly straightforward to show that the private rms
prot is always higher under an output subsidy than under an R&D subsidy: i.e. 1js=sq >
1js=sx . Intuitively, the private rm cares only about its own prot. Thus, an output subsidy
which redistributes output from the public to the private rm, implies that the private rm
enjoys an increase in its market share. The public rm, on the contrary, maximises welfare
rather than its own prot. This means that the public rm internalises the positive e¤ect of
the R&D subsidy both on private prot and consumer surplus. Therefore, the public rm
undertakes more R&D than its private counterpart, even though R&D is costly.7 If spillovers
are high, then an increase in R&D incentivised by an R&D subsidy, will generate a larger extent
of overall cost reduction compared to an output subsidy. Indeed, the public rms prot will
be higher under an R&D subsidy than under an output subsidy provided that spillovers are
su¢ ciently high: i.e. 0js=sx > 0js=sq if  > 0:7. Combining private and public prot,
the total PS will then be relatively higher under an R&D subsidy, but only if spillovers are
su¢ ciently high, as condition (6) suggests.
6We have checked that CS increases fasterwith an R&D subsidy than with an output subsidy, as long as 
is su¢ ciently high; that is, @
@
(CSjs=sx   CSjs=sq ) > 0 if  > 0:33. Thus, having started with a lower level of CS
under an R&D subsidy, CS eventually becomes higher under an R&D subsidy.
7 It is well known that, in a purely private market, higher spillovers have the e¤ect of reducing the amount of
R&D undertaken by each rm. This is because the prot from investing in R&D cannot be fully appropriated.
However, in the mixed market, and in the absence of subsidies, the public rm invests more as spillovers increase;
while the private rm invests less, except if spillovers are relatively high (i.e. except if  > 0:88). Thus the
private rm tends to free-ride on the public rms R&D, unless spillovers are relatively high. As has already been
mentioned by Gil-Moltó et al. (2011), an R&D subsidy can address this market failure by inducing the private
rm to invest more as  increases. We have also conrmed that the same result regarding the private rms R&D
is true under an output subsidy for most spillover values (except if spillovers are close to zero).
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Finally, considering the costs of subsidy provision, S, we assess the relative welfare e¤ects
of the two subsidy schemes. We nd that an R&D subsidy leads to greater SW than an output
subsidy if
SWx  SWq > 0
SWjs=sx   SWjs=sq > 0
 > sw (7)
where sw  0:54. As expected, a threshold value for spillovers exists such that an R&D subsidy
may (or may not) be socially superior to an output subsidy. Indeed, from the foregoing analysis
we know that an R&D subsidy increases both CS and PS, but only if spillovers are su¢ ciently
high; which is in line with condition (7). This is because higher spillovers generate higher
cost savings from R&D which are su¢ ciently larger than the ones from an output subsidy to
compensate for the wasteful cost asymmetry. Therefore, as long as spillovers are su¢ ciently
high, an R&D subsidy will lead to a relatively larger increase in welfare, and thus, it will be
socially superior to an output subsidy. Otherwise, an output subsidy will be socially superior.
The following Proposition summarises this position.
Proposition 1 Social welfare is higher under an R&D subsidy than under an output subsidy if
spillovers are su¢ ciently high,  > sw; and social welfare is lower under an R&D subsidy than
under an output subsidy if spillovers are su¢ ciently low,  < sw.
Proof. Let  = SWjs=sx  SWjs=sq . The sign of  can be either positive or negative depending
on  2 [0; 1]. It is easy to check that ( = 0) =  17479(a c)22250225 < 0, and ( = 1) = 388179(a c)
2
6934700 >
0. Moreover, @=@ < 0 if  < 0:14 and @=@ > 0, otherwise. By continuity, there exists a
critical value of  dened as sw  fj  = 0g where sw  0:54, such that  < 0 if  < sw
and  > 0, otherwise.
The analysis to this point has assumed the existence of two rms. It might be wondered
whether our results extend to an oligopoly. In this variant, it is fairly straightforward to show
that, if the number of private rms increases, then the importance of an output subsidy relative
to an R&D subsidy decreases. This is because a higher number of private rms mean that
the output asymmetry between the public and the private rms will be smaller in the absence
6
of subsidies. Therefore, the role of an output subsidy in redistributing output becomes less
prominent.8 Moreover, our analysis makes the assumption that the R&D cost parameter, , is
equal to 1. Within a model that explicitly accounts for the e¢ ciency of R&D, intuition suggests
that, the higher  is, the more costly it will be to do R&D; thus, the smaller will be the cost
savings associated with a given R&D subsidy relative to an output subsidy. Only when spillovers
are high and R&D is cheap (i.e.  is high and  is low) and so the potential welfare gains from
an R&D subsidy are relatively large would adopting an R&D subsidy be socially superior to
an output subsidy. Otherwise, an output subsidy would be socially superior.9 The intuition
is analogous regarding output production technology.10 That is, a lower level of e¢ ciency will
reduce the positive welfare e¤ect of an output subsidy relative to an R&D subsidy, thus making
an output subsidy relatively less attractive.
4 Appendix
The subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes without subsidies and with an R&D subsidy come
from Gil-Moltó et al. (2011). The following Table presents the equilibrium outcomes under an
output subsidy.11
8For example, the threshold values of spillover below which an output subsidy is socially superior to an R&D
subsidy are approximately 0.54, 0.29, 0.20 and 0.14 as the number of private rms becomes 1, 2, 3 and 4,
respectively.
9The calculations supporting this claim are available from the authors on request.
10A lower level of e¢ ciency in the production of output corresponds to a higher level of  within the context
of the cost function Ci(qi; xi; xj) = (c  xi   xj)qi + q2i ; i 6= j; i; j 2 f0; 1g.
11We have checked that the second-order conditions of all maximisation problems are fullled. Though not
reported here, these conditions are available from the authors on request.
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Equilibrium Solutions under an Optimal Output Subsidy
q0js=sq =
(a c)(71420+61043 426672 165063+103424 14705+1626)
250025+136138 1685012 216043+345664 74965+3686+2407 368
q1js=sq =
11(a c)(6483+5539 15442 13103+1544+845 186)
250025+136138 1685012 216043+345664 74965+3686+2407 368
x0js=sq =
2(a c)(17774+34511+16242 109913+14634+2335 1386+187)
250025+136138 1685012 216043+345664 74965+3686+2407 368
x1js=sq =
2(a c)(3 )(6483+5539 15442 13103+1544+845 186)
250025+136138 1685012 216043+345664 74965+3686+2407 368
0js=sq =
A(a c)2
(250025+136138 1685012 216043+345664 74965+3686+2407 368)2
1js=sq =
2(a c)2(103+12 22)(6483+5539 15442 13103+1544+845 186)2
(250025+136138 1685012 216043+345664 74965+3686+2407 368)2
CSjs=sq =
(a c)2(142733+121972 596512 309163+120364 5465 366)2
2(250025+136138 1685012 216043+345664 74965+3686+2407 368)2
SWjs=sq =
(a c)2(142787+121054 582112 281763+114824 12485+1446)
2(250025+136138 1685012 216043+345664 74965+3686+2407 368)
sq =
11(a c)(6159+10255+8382 46383+904+6005 1086)
250025+136138 1685012 216043+345664 74965+3686+2407 368
where A8675789676+16004329315-27096041312-154646221573-4997100914+57903847565-2549399986-
9284054067+1788867088+272977369-1333550810+238584011-27594012+1987213-129614.
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